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THE MEDICAL PROFESSION AND
THE ADVERSARY PROCESS
BY E. L. HAINES* **
Before we accuse the medical profession of maintaining a wall of silence
in order to avoid testifying in our courts, it may be worthwhile to enquire
as to the attitude of other citizens. Then we might go on to consider doctors
and their special reasons for non-involvement. If there is substance in their
reluctance, perhaps we might examine the adversary system; its possible
defects and solutions. And lest we are blind to what other systems of juris-
prudence offer, we might consider how litigation is conducted in a modern
western European country operating under what is commonly called the
Inquisitorial System. This examination of one of the world's oldest systems,
under which by far the largest number of its citizens resolve their differences,
might even give rise to a slight glimmer of misgiving about our own Anglo-
American adversary process. Finally, it might be worthwhile to explore a few
innovations in medical and hospital malpractice cases that may make for
better public acceptance.
Let us turn now to the average citizen and his attitude toward our
system of justice. That great jurist Learned Hand once remarked "Short of
sickness and death, I would avoid a law suit above all else." He was speaking
of parties. What of the witnesses? How often do witnesses volunteer in auto-
mobile accident cases where their evidence might be vital to one side or
another? Since they are motorists, one would expect a certain degree of sym-
pathy, but the investigating officer often enquires in a loud voice for witnesses
amongst the bystanders, who remain silent. And if the matter has criminal
connotations, silence is becoming the rule. Perhaps the nadir was reached in
the knife murder of Ruth Genovese in New York City, when twenty-six
people heard her scream for help and none responded or called the police.
Why is there this public attitude of non-involvement? Why should our courts
be compelled to try issues on only partial evidence? Without witnesses, justice
under our adversary system is impaired.
There are many reasons why responsible citizens do not come forward.
There is the loss of time caused by endless adjournments, the loss of income,
and the pitifully small witness fee. Then there is the unlimited right of a
lawyer to cause a subpoena to be issued in the Queen's name requiring the
putting aside of all personal matters and attendance in court to await the con-
venience of the tribunal and the lawyers. Refusal to comply is enforced by
contempt proceedings - truly a remarkable power to command testimony
at a place and time convenient to the court and litigants. Once in court, a
strange and unusual place for the witness, he finds himself cast in a partisan
*Justice of the Supreme Court of Ontario.
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role. He is put forward because his testimony supports the cause of one of
the warring parties.1 Immediately he is attacked by the other side on what
he has heard, seen, and remembered, and then for good measure, he may
find his credibility questioned. At no time is he the court's witness. His main
function is popularly understood to be not so much that of establishing the
truth as supporting the allegations of the party who offered his testimony.2
He is sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, but
then is compelled to answer only the specific questions of the lawyers. He,
cannot have counsel appear for him. I am waiting for the day when some
frustrated witness who has answered counsel's questions will turn to me and
ask, "Now may I tell the whole truth?" Viewed in the perspective of what
happens daily to thousands of witnesses in.Canadian and American courts, it
is not difficult to understand their reluctance, and discover that they learn
through their own experience, or that of their friends, that the ordeal may
be avoided by the simple expedient of remaining silent.
Let us now consider the position of a doctor involved in a malpractice
action. Doctors do not take kindly to the adversary system. It is entirely
foreign to their way of settling disputes. When they disagree on a diagnosis
or a treatment technique, they attempt to resolve it by obtaining the assist-
ance of more experienced scientists and each joins in an objective search for
the truth. It would be unthinkable for them to refer the matter to an inde-
pendent layman, whether he be a judge or jury. Even if they did, there are
no specialist judges in malpractice matters and the majority have no training
in basic anatomy and physiology. The courts seem to dislike calling an expert
assistant to sit with the judge and assist him in understanding the evidence.
Leaving aside those few cases of such obvious error that the law implies
negligence from the event (res ipsa loquitur), the great bulk of bad results
from medical care arise in a terribly grey area where the law may see negli-
gence but medicine sees merely an unexpected occurrence in a very inexact
art. Here we must recognize the difference in thinking between lawyers and
doctors. The lawyer is armed with the most accurate diagnostic instrument,
the "retroscope". With twenty-twenty vision he seizes on the unfortunate
result, second-guesses the doctor and charges him with fault, although at the
time of treatment the symptoms and the various tests presented a very foggy
picture and resulted in a complex, differential diagnosis.
However, the major objection of the doctor to a malpractice action is
the confirmed belief of the medical profession that the suit is a reflection on
his professional abilities and standing. The very name "malpractice" repels
him, and in the minds of some denotes quasi-criminal or unethical conduct,
a loss of standing with his colleagues in the medical profession, degradation
in the eyes of his patients and the community in which he practices, or loss
of possible promotion and staff privileges in local hospitals. And, indeed,
there is some basis for these fears. What obstetrician found liable for mis-
managing an obstetrical case, or an anaesthetist for an untimely death would
I See Laidlaw, l.A., in De Jussel v. Hazer, [1948] O.W.N. 468.
2 S. Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. Boston: Little Brown & Company. 1892)/sec.
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be proffered a senior appointment in his hospital? In addition, is it not likely
that unfortunate publicity might seriously impair income?
Here the doctor encounters what he considers an anomaly. When a
lawyer is sued for malpractice (and there are many errors and omissions as
evidenced by the very high lawyers' insurance premiums in Ontario) the case
is relatively short. Usually it is settled without action or before trial. Never
does the court require evidence of the lawyer's standard of care. Why? The
Judge himself is a lawyer and he knows the standards. But in the medical
malpractice action the judge does not know the standards. He must hear
evidence from those who will testify to the standard and wherein the defend-
ant departed from it. That evidence can only be supplied by other doctors
and here the trouble arises. Seeing only the bad result, and assuming it could
only be caused by neglect, the plaintiff's feelings run high. The defendant
considers it happened as an unfortunate occurrence or through a justifiable
error in judgment.
It has been the practice of the Ontario Medical Association to designate
an accredited specialist to be available to advise plaintiff's counsel and appear
as a witness at the trial. It has helped a great deal, but quite naturally any
doctor is reluctant to point an accusing finger at- another colleague in the
grey area in which most malpractice cases seem to fall. Mistaking sincerity
for sympathy for a fellow practitioner, the plaintiff is too ready to believe in
a wall of medical silence.
Canadian doctors shudder at the chaos south of the border where mal-
practice actions have reached epidemic proportions and insurance premiums
are astronomical. They fail to recognize the difference in Canada. First we
have no contingent fees, with the corresponding lawyers' enthusiasm generated
by the expectation of a generous proportion of the verdict. Secondly, rarely
are medical malpractice cases tried by a jury, something which in the United
States is a constitutional right.3 Thirdly, in all but seven of the United States,
8See Kempffer v. Conerty (1901), 2 O.L.R. 658 n. (C.A.); McNulty v. Morris
(1901), 2 O.L.R. 656 (CA.); Town v. Archer (1902), 4 O.L.R. 383; Hodgins v.
Banting (1906), 12 O.L.R. 117; Gerbracht v. Bingham (1912), 7 D.L.R. 259, 23
O.W.R. 82, 4 O.W.N. 117; Wilkinson v. Hayes (1915), 9 O.W.N. 124; Smith v. Rae
(1920), 51 D.L.R. 323 (CA.), (1919), 46 O.LR. 518, (Use of jury criticized);
Sweetman v. Law (1923), 23 O.W.N. 502; Mercer v. Gray, [1941] O.R. 127 at 131
(CA.); Jaffray v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Sault Ste. Marie et al., [1966] 2 O.R. 304
(Jury denied in suit against hospital and nurse).
The position in the other provinces is similar. British Columbia: Plowright v.
Seldon, [1933] 2 D.L.R. 804, (1932), 45 B.C.R. 481, affirming [1932] 1 W.W.R. 792;
Taylor v. Vancouver General Hospital (No. 1), [1945] 4 D.L.R. 737, 3 W.W.R. 510,
62 B.C.R. 42; leave to appeal to the Privy Council refused 62 B.C.R. 79 (C.A.); Steele
v. Walker, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 147 (CA.), (1953), 9 W.W.R. (N.S.) 413; York v. Lapp(1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 351. Alberta: The Jury Act, R.SA. 1970, c. 194, s. 32(2);
Duxbury v. Calgary, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 684 (CA.), 1 W.W.R. 174. Manitoba: Kingsbury
v. Washington, [1925] 4 D.L.R. 632 (CA.), 3 W.W.R. 436, 35 Man. R. 246, affirmingjudgment of Curran J. (unreported) which reversed [1925] 3 D.L.R. 326, 2 W.W.R.
430, (CA. refused to follow Ontario cases, jury trial allowed); Durkin v. Sisters of
Charity of St. Boniface General Hospital (1938), 46 Man. R. 158, affirmed [1938]
3 D.L.R. 802, (Jury trial refused). Quebec: Art. 332 C.C.P.; Art. 337 C.C.P.; Bernard
v. C., [1969] C.S. 343 (Jury trial refused in malpractice action under authority of Art.
337). Nova Scotia: Marshall v. Curry (No. 2), [1933] 3 D.L.R. 198, 6 M.P.R. 267.
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contributory negligence in a plaintiff is a complete bar to recovery, so insurers
are encouraged to defend. In Canada the plaintiff's claim is merely reduced
by the degree that his fault contributed to his loss.
Perhaps more important is a factor not readily apparent. Most Cana-
dian doctors are members of a strong medical protective association which
has made it a practice never to settle on the basis of economy. If a doctor is
proven at fault, they pay. If he is not at fault then they will spend a fortune
in defence. They may not always succeed, but they have rid the Canadian
courts of nuisance malpractice claims and their members of the harrassment
of being sued without cause or on flimsy grounds.
When malpractice cases do go to trial, the court must hear at length
evidence as to the standard of care and often very complex evidence as to
facts giving rise to the misfortune, some of which are flatly contradictory. It
must do its best in an adversary atmosphere operating under rules of shifting
burdens of proof and presumptions. Often these cases end up in appeals and
the costs are very heavy.
Fortunately not many malpractice cases come to court in Canada. When
they do they follow the same course as other civil actions: writs, pleadings,
motions prior to trial, production of documents, examination for discovery,
extensive interviews with witnesses, research of the law by the lawyers and
extensive study in all relevant medical matters so that the lawyers may be
informed of the science in question. From the commencement of the law suit
until the trial it may take months or years and is usually very expensive.
From the victim's standpoint he may have trouble finding a competent lawyer
knowledgeable in malpractice matters, and, if he succeeds, in raising the funds
sufficient to pay his fees and those of medical consultants who are prepared
to act and perhaps to testify.
The trial is usually lengthy and medical practitioners are reluctant to
testify since they abhor the courtroom procedure through which their profes-
sional competence is questioned and their wits and self-control badgered and
tested by what must seem to them counsel's continual harrassment. It is not
unusual for several partisan experts to be called and contradict each other.
The judge sorts it out as best he can. If the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant
insurer pays the judgment and the defendant doctor suffers the embarrassment
of a judicial finding reflecting on his conduct. If the plaintiff loses, the defend-
ant has undergone one to three years of having his professional competence
under question, and that alone might constitute a substantial loss.
Under the adversary system a medical malpractice case is one of the
most difficult, expensive, and unsatisfactory, to all involved. Is there a better
way of resolving these matters?
The Inquisitorial System
There are many excellent models in western Europe. Perhaps one of the
best is in Germany.4 In the interest of conciseness, let us follow the average
German civil case briefly. As strangers we are going to encounter many
4 B. Kapan, A. Von Mehren, and The Honourable R, Schaefer, Phases of German
Civil Procedure (1958), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193.
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surprises. First there are no juries. The higher courts function as Collegial
Courts, that is, a trial is conducted by three judges who, having obtained their
degrees as lawyers, have then gone on to post-graduate work and obtained
a degree in judicial administration. If appointed to the bench they have
thereafter confined themselves to the judicial role. So at the very threshold
we have the courts run by expert career judges who have arrived at their
positions by long training and experience. Nowhere in the Anglo-American
system have we a comparable system of training for the bench. Furthermore,
it is taken for granted that the judges know the law and will apply the appro-
priate legal principles in the resolution of the dispute. Proceedings are
commenced by the claimant filing a document of demand in which he sets
forth the facts, his proof, and the names of his witnesses. The defendant files
his answer, setting out his facts, proof, and witnesses. The parties' declarations
regarding the factual circumstances must be complete in accordance with the
truth, and a party must reckon that the rules of court provide that in coming
to a judgment the court is to take into account, along with the formal proof,
the behaviour of the parties throughout the litigation. The court resents
technicality and struggles for substantial justice.
When the complaint and answer are delivered, the president judge of
the College examines the documents and decides whether the next step will
be taken by the full court or by one of its members. Usually it is the latter
and the judge designated will remain seized of what we would consider a
series of pre-trial conferences which are designed to give the court a better
understanding of the issues so as to enable it to direct the course of the
litigation. Basic in the rules is that all measures must be taken at every stage
by the court to settle litigation, and often this is achieved in the first confer-
ence. Early settlement means a large saving of litigation expense. At these
conferences the parties must be present with their counsel. There is free and
complete discussion. Issues are clarified. Admissions are made. Directions
are given of what is to be done and what witnesses are to be called. The court
arranges for the attendance of the witnesses and examines them. Counsel
for the parties may also examine. Contrary to the intensive pre-trial inter-
viewing of witnesses by their Canadian confreres under the adversary system,
the German lawyer refrains from such interviews or is very cautious about
them simply because it is the court that is seeking the truth and the parties
with their lawyers assume the role of assisting the court. There is no such
thing as a defendant waiting to see if the plaintiff can make out a prima
facie case and then calling his defence. In the pre-trial conferences, each
party will be asked his position in respect of each issue and will disclose his
witnesses. If the subject matter is admitted by the opponent, the calling of
the witnesses is unnecessary. It must be emphasized again that these con-
ferences are conducted by experienced jurists expert in discovering the truth,
and that they go about it unencumbered by rules of procedure and evidence
designed to limit the enquiry or exclude evidence. The judges are in charge.
Everything that may be of help is investigated.
A very substantial number of the exclusionary rules considered by
Wigmore have no counterpart in the German Law of Evidence. For example,
hearsay evidence is freely received - and then freely evaluated. Therefore
that distracting obligato of American trials, counsels' objections to questions
1973]
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and rulings by the Court, is almost entirely absent. Especially are these
quarrels at a minimum because it is the Court that puts most of the questions.
The evidence is sifted and examined in these pre-trial conferences with al
interested parties being required to make disclosure. A careful record of the
evidence of each party is taken. Where it is necessary to call witnesses the
court gives the appropriate direction for their attendance at the next con-
ference. If witnesses appear they are examined, and if a matter of credibility
arises they are held over for hearing by the full court. These repeated dis-
cussions or conferences are devoted to the progressive shaping of the issues
and the content of the case by a process of clarification, either to the pacifica-
tion of the parties, or failing that, to the propulsion of the litigation. They
are more of a collaborative investigation than an adversary presentation.
Settlements are common in the process. The intensity and candour of the
courts' drive toward settlement will astonish the Canadian observer. The rules
direct that the first order of business at the first conference is to attempt an
amicable settlement, and the rules authorize the full court to do so at all
stages. Lawyers do not complain of strong official impulsion towards settle-
ment, nor is there a feeling that a judge's impartiality is to be questioned
because he has pressed for settlement.
The court has power to obtain an expert's written opinion, or call an
expert; and it has power to take a view. The parties may put forth other
experts if they so desire.
A Canadian lawyer will be conscious of a questing attitude on the part
of German judges and of the cooperation of the German lawyer in aiding
that quest. If the case is not settled in the conference stage, then an order
is made as to what witnesses are to be called and the issues to be argued.
These pre-trial conferences may be considered as a process of ripening the
case for trial by the full court. At trial only the witnesses nominated by the
parties or court are examined and usually their summons indicates the areas
on which they are expected to testify. The presiding judge asks most of the
questions. Counsel often suggest other questions or they may be permitted
to examine the witness directly. There are no surprise witnesses, because of
the obligation of complete disclosure. It would be hard to find in German
courts anything resembling the Canadian-style clashes between experts paid
to be partial, fiercely and interminably examined by lawyers with smatterings
of contrived learning on the expert's specialty. Basically it is the court's
responsibility to determine whether an expert opinion is needed. Even though
a party may propose a particular expert, the court is entitled to reject him
and select another.
In essence, the German Inquisitorial System in civil cases may be sum-
marized as being a tribunal of trained judges engaged in a quest for truth
supported by rules requiring the parties to make complete disclosure at all
times. There is an obligation on the court to protect both parties and reach
a right result regardless of the faults of advocacy. Connected with what might
be called their doctrine that all relevant evidence is admissible, is the prin-
ciple of pre-evaluation ... the court is to give such weight to the evidence,
including the happenings in the courtroom, as it deserves in reason. Pre-
evaluation is dominant and pervasive in German law. Finally the standards
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of proof on a proponent are a little higher than in Anglo-American civil
cases where we act upon the balance of probabilities. Perhaps if our courts
had the pre-judicial training of the German judges together with the Inquisi-
torial System at our disposal, we could require the same high standard of
proof. As it is we must get along on the mere balance of probabilities to
accommodate ourselves to the gamesmanship of the adversary process.5
Improvements in the Adversary System
Before he was made Chief Justice of the United States, Warren E.
Burger was one of a panel of one hundred and fifty experts invited to con-
tribute ideas toward a more perfect constitution for the United States. One
of his suggestions was "Put an end to the adversary trial." 6 He was of the
opinion that it did not necessarily produce justice. It is unlikely the Anglo-
American adversary system will be abandoned in the near future. It has been
with us for centuries and its greatest strength lies in the freedom of control
each litigant has in presenting his cause before an independent tribunal. It
makes for a greater acceptance of the result; in fact it may be said that the
Anglo-American system survives because of this manner of dispute resolu-
tion. Jurists and lawyers repeat fondly the words of Lord Hewart in Rex v.
Sussex Justices7 "That justice must not only be done but manifestly appear
to be done." Now almost fifty years later, when our system of justice is under
severe attack, should we not add to that ethic that "those who have justice
done to them must recognize it as justice"? The personal equation now enters
every process, and in my respectful opinion, the seventies will, I hope, be
known as the decade in which our courts will declare the great rights of the
people. The one fault of the adversary system of justice is that it only works
well when the parties are of equal strength. Since this process is conceived
as the resolution of a contest between two warring parties before an objective
tribunal, it follows that somehow each party must have the resources to
present his cause adequately. This of course is not so. Today in a civil case
only the poor, assisted by legal aid, or the very rich, can afford to litigate.
The middle man who pays his way, his taxes, and perhaps owns a piece of
property, cannot possibly afford to risk his hard-earned assets in litigation
where the loser must pay the legal fees of the winner. It could be ruinous.
Add to this the heavy fees of retaining able counsel and the expenses of
preparation, and it is obvious that he cannot afford justice. Ontario Legal
Aid has done much, and is doing more, but we are still a very long way
from satisfying our citizens' sense of justice. A man will put up with sickness
and death, but a sense of injustice makes him want to tear things down. We
can expound upon the essentials of justice and the appearance of justice in
the trial process. But what of the man who cannot cross the court's threshold?
If he is to have a sense of justice, he must know that somewhere, somehow,
in the system is a judge or jury accessible to him who will "put things right".
5For an interesting discussion of the basic features of civil procedure in Italy see
Professor Angelo Piero Sereni, Basic Features of Civil Procedure in Italy (1952), 1
American Journal of Comparative Law 373.
6C. Morris, A View of Malpractice in the 1970's (1971), Insurance Council
Journal 521.
7 [1924] 1 K.B. 256 at 259.
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And that belief must include his fellow man, because it is unthinkable that
some should enjoy their privilege while it is denied to others. So it would
seem the first great hurdle we must overcome is the equal and ready accessi-
bility of our citizens to our courts. That will not be easy.
Secondly, the adversary system tends to lend itself to so much delay
and expense. The courts in an effort to preserve their objectivity tend to
assume a passive role. A law suit proceeds at the pace achieved by the
opposing litigants, and time usually works in favour of a defendant and
against a plaintiff. Some courts have backlogs that are really quite lengthy.
Delay is not difficult for a clever lawyer to achieve. As we know, unlike the
courts under the Inquisitorial System in Germany, our courts take no active
part in resolving the dispute by early conciliation conferences, nor do they
actively participate in propelling the case by getting into the very middle
of the dispute, discovering the real issues and moving the case to trial. I have
heard it said that under the adversary system a judge who participates too
closely in dispute resolution is apt to have his eyes beclouded by the dust of
the arena. Analogies limp. A lawsuit is not a bullfight nor a gladiatorial com-
bat. It is two citizens trying to settle their differences under a system that
compels them to take adversary positions. They may not be showing them-
selves to advantage because they are quarreling with each other, but usually
each really wants peaceable resolution. It seems to me that our next great step
is effective, inexpensive and early conciliation. Perhaps we will have to sacri-
fice a few sacred cows in the adversary corral. That step lies in the partial
adoption of a concept inherent in the Inquisitorial System.
The court must be prepared to take an active role in the resolution of
the dispute from its initiation, either by bringing about early settlement or by
expediting the trial. We must take the gamesmanship out of litigation and
make a lawsuit an objective inquiry after truth. In a businesslike manner our
judges could bring together the parties and their counsel, and requiring full
disclosure, discover the true issues and areas of dispute, give instructions for
their resolution, and fix a provisional date for trial. Is it too much to adopt
the concept that once a lawsuit is commenced it will be heard within a sti-
pulated time unless otherwise ordered? The public is entitled to this efficiency.
(In Scotland a criminal case must be brought to trial within 110 days, subject
to a further extension in the discretion of the court) 8 Is not civil litigation
equally important? The law's delays must be overcome.
Thirdly, we could improve the adversary system by having accredited
specialists within the legal profession, and special courts. In the Ontario
Supreme Court we have a bankruptcy court presided over by an expert in
bankruptcy matters who proceeds most expeditiously. There are no others,
yet one would think that criminal, negligence, matrimonial, corporate and
several other areas could be the subject of specialties in the interest of more
8 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887, s. 37 and s. 43. For England, the Royal
Commission on Assize and Quarter Sessions, 1966-69, (Beeching Commission), Cmnd.
4153, para. 200, recommended a goal of disposition of cases within four weeks of
committal.
New York adopted effective May 1, 1972 a goal of a trial date within six months
of the date of arrest or summons. Similar measures ranging from 50 to 180 days have
been adopted in California, Illinois, New Mexico, Florida, and the District of Columbia.
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efficient administration of justice. It is rather quaint that we should expect
our judges to be expert in everything. Lawyers will testify that when a
dispute is brought before a judge who has specialized in a matter being heard,
the trial takes a fraction of the time, the result is better, and best of all,
settlements often result. While it is unlikely we will ever have a judge who
is qualified both as a doctor and a lawyer and who will be permitted to
exercise his knowledge as a doctor during the trial, I think there are a few
areas where we can make improvements.
First, there is specialization within the bar itself. Unlike the medical
profession with its great number of accredited specialists, the bar has only
self-accredited specialists, or perhaps more correctly, the lawyer may do very
well in a certain branch of the law and be known amongst his clients as a
specialist. All attempts so far in the American and Canadian legal profession
to create accredited specialists by post-graduate training and experience have
failed. 9 The law schools can readily parallel the post-graduate courses avail-
able in medicine, and there are leaders in the legal profession quite able to
give the same specialized instruction that their medical counterparts give to
medical students. Why has there not been the same development toward
specialization in the legal profession that we have found in the medical pro-
fession? The answer seems to be that lawyers have not wanted it, since as
generalists they feel adequate to any task, and there are few who would
want to accept the stricture of limiting practice to a specialty and being obliged
to refer the client to another lawyer.
With our remarkable proliferation of new law and legal concepts, this
is one of the challenges facing the organized bar today. To serve adequately
we must have legal specialists duly accredited by appropriate university studies
and kept up to date by experience and continuing educational programmes.
It is probable that it will occur in the future. If it does, then specialist courts
will soon follow. More importantly, in the hands of specialists there will be
fewer law suits and more settlements. A medical malpractice case would be
a good illustration. A specialist trained in medical malpractice would have
the essential basic knowledge of anatomy and physiology and the resources
to discover quickly whether there was a departure from standard medical
practice; thus he or she could promptly advise the client whether there is a
good cause of action. Many of those lawsuits arising in the grey area of
medical practice would never be brought because the lawyer would know the
unfortunate result was a mere error of judgment in circumstances that do not
attract negligence. At the same time he would recognize and pursue the real
cases of fault, and these would probably be settled. In the result the public,
the medical profession, and the bench and bar, would all profit by this new
degree of excellence.
Another improvement could be in the use of experts to assist the court
in interpreting the evidence. This practice is very ancient, but lately has fallen
into disuse in tort cases. Holdsworth cites several examples of the courts in
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries calling for an opinion from experts to
9 See Haines, Specialists Within the Profession (1968), 2 Law Society Gazette 11.
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assist them in coming to a conclusion on factual matters.10 He quotes a judge
as saying, in 1554, that -
If matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or faculties, we com-
monly apply for the aid of that science of faculty which it concerns, which is an
honourable and commendable thing in our law. For thereby it appears that we
,do not despise all other sciences but our own, but we approve of them and
encourage them as things worthy of commendation."
In Admiralty cases the courts have almost invariably sat with two expert
naval captains, and no other expert evidence is allowed.' 2
Most Canadian provinces have rules for the use of experts to assist the
trial courts.' 3 The Ontario rule is as follows:' 4
267. (1) The court may obtain the assistance of merchants, engineers, accountants,
actuaries, or scientific persons, in such way as it thinks fit, the better to
enable it to determine any matter of fact in question in any cause or pro-
ceeding, and may act on the certificate of such persons
(2) The court may fix the renumeration of any such person and may direct
payment thereof by any of the parties.
10 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law (London: Methuen & Co., 1903-66) at
212.
1"Saunders J. in Buckley v. Rice Thomas, 1 Plowden, 118 at 124.
12 In England: "Admiralty", 1 Halsbury (3rd ed.), Para. Nos. 212, 272 and 322;
"Admiralty", 1 Supplement to Halsbury (3rd ed.), para. 212; 1970 Supreme Court
Practice, Vol. 1, 0. 29, R. 3, n. 3; 0. 33, R. 6, n. 1; ). 59, R. 10, n. 2 & 3; 0. 75, R.
25(2), n. 2;0. 75, R. 28, n. 1; 0. 75, R. 41, nn. 1 & 6. Id., Vol. 2, Judicature Act, s. 98;
Sixth Cumulative Supplement to 1970 Supreme Court Practice, Vol. 1, Paras. 29/2-3/3;
29/2-3/4; 59/10/2; 75/25, 3418; Williams, Admiralty Practice (3rd ed. London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1902) at 440-47; McGuffie, "Admiralty Practice" in 1 British Shipping
Laws (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964) ss. 1037, 1212-16, 1261-63, 1331, 1373-75;
F. L. Wiswall, The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice Since 1800
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) at 17-18.
In Canada: Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.S-19, s. 31; Admiralty Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. A-I, s. 30; Federal Court Rule 492 (Assessors); "Admiralty", 5A Halsbury
(3rd ed., Can. Converter) para. 212; "Admiralty" 1 C.E.D. (Ont.), s. 101; E. C.Mayers,
Admiralty Law and Practice (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1916) at 261-62, 268.
13 Provisions in rules and statutes concerning the use of experts in the provinces
outside Ontario and England are as follows:
Newfoundland: Judicature Act, Revised Statutes of Newfoundland 1952, c. 114, s.
205 (arbitrator).
Nova Scotia: Judicature Act, s. 43 (assessors); Rules of the Supreme Court, 0.
34, r. 6 (assessors); 0. 34, r. 35 (assessors); 0. 55, r. 12 (equivalent to Oat. R. 267).
New Brunswick: Rules of the Supreme Court, 0. 35, r. 5 (equivalent to Ont. R.
267); 0. 36, r. 4 (assessors); 0. 36, r. 43 (assessors); 0. 55, r. 19 (equivalent to Oat.
R. 267).
Manitoba: Queen's Bench Rule 351 (2) (equivalent to Oat. R. 267).
Alberta: Rules of Court, R. 218 (Independent Court Expert); R. 235 (assessors).
British Columbia: Supreme Court Rules, 0. 36, r. 2 (assessors); 0. 36, r. 43(assessors); 0. 55, r. 19 (equivalent to Ont. R. 267).
Quebec: Articles 46, 399, and 414 to 424 of the Quebec Civil Code of Procedure
seem to resemble the inquisitorial systems. In Dame Boivin v. Remillard, [1969] C.S.
203 these provisions were used to justify the examination of a man by an impartial
psychiatrist to determine if he was fit to manage his own affairs, on the initiative of
the judge in the face of conflicting medical testimony.
England: Supreme Court Practice, 1970 0. 32, 4. 16 (equivalent to Ont. R. 267);
0. 33, r. 6 (assessors); 0. 40, rr. 1-5 (court expert).
14 Holmstead & Gale, Ontario Practice Year Book 1972, ed. W. J. Hemmerick,
(Toronto: Carswells Co. Ltd.).
Adversary Process
In tort litigation little use is made of experts on the bench. Recently
some doubt was thrown on the constitutionality of the Ontario rule (see
Phillips v. Ford Motor Company) 15 but a subsequent court took occasion to
reaffirm the right of a trial judge to rely on the assistance of experts.16
Much can be said concerning the use of experts who assist the trial
judge. The court owes a duty to be scientifically correct as well as legally
correct, and the judge in an adversary system is apt to encounter each side
presenting skilled experts who present quite persuasively, opposite views. He
may find himself somewhat bewildered. However, if he has beside him on the
bench experts whom the parties agree are impartial, he will have the benefit
of their guidance in the understanding of the evidence, and no less important,
the restraint of their presence will serve to dampen the enthusiasm of the
adversary expert witness.
Concurrently the trial judge may encounter a disturbing influence. The
impartial experts sitting beside him will not take kindly to the adversary
system. They think little of it as a means of discovering objective truths. They
make their influence felt as they direct attention to the half-truths of the
contending scientist, and appear aghast when the judge replies that "a law-
suit is not a scientific investigation for the discovery of truth, but a proceeding
to determine the basis for, and to arrive at a settlement of, a dispute between
litigants.117 If the impartial experts accept these strictures all may be well.
Unfortunately their reaction is apt to be in the opposite direction. The impar-
tial expert is usually a very experienced and dedicated man who holds an
honourable place in his profession. His thrust will be to shake off the shackles
of the adversary system, seek the true facts and respond to what he considers
his public duty as a scientist, rather than adopt a limited role of assisting an
arbitrator. Perhaps this is the reason why few judges use experts to assist
them. Perhaps this is also a hidden persuader in the doctors' decisions to
avoid courts. When accused of malpractice, he may feel entitled to at least
a trial by his peers.
Personally, in a complicated malpractice action or technical case of any
kind, I welcome the presence on the bench of an impartial expert to assist
me in understanding the evidence. There is an additional dividend. Upon the
appointment of the impartial expert to advise the court, the parties very fre-
quently settle. I suppose a trial before a lay judge may be one thing; a trial
before a lay judge assisted by impartial experts may be quite another.
Some form of such dispute resolution may come, and if it does, I hope
that the public and the bar will not oppose it on the grounds that if doctors
sit as impartial advisers to judges they will be apt to favour doctors. Such a
view would overlook the fact that judges lean over backwards against their
friends, and further, most professions recognize it as a public duty to rid
their ranks of the incompetent.' 8
15 [1970] 2 O.R. 714 (C.A.).
16 Featherstone v. Grunsven et al., [1972] 1 O.R. 490 (C.A.).
17 E. M. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, American Law Institute (Washing-
ton, 1969) at 8.
18 But see, Hay v. Bain, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1165 (Alta.).
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The Alternative - Loss Insurance"9
Whether or not any of the foregoing solutions are adopted, the present
system of liability of doctors and hospitals remains based on fault. The
victim encounters the law, its expense and uncertainty. The defendant must
devote valuable time and money in the defence as well as suffer possible loss
of reputation. The trend in this century has been to replace the concept of
fault and negligence with loss insurance. Workmens' Compensation statutes
are an excellent example. Many jurisdictions have adopted or are adopting
no-fault automobile insurance, or at the least accident benefits recoverable by
the victim without proof of fault.
As medical practice moves from the doctor's office to the hospital or
clinic, the old patient-doctor relationship will be replaced by practitioners
directing teams of para-medical personnel. Anonymity will become the rule.
The stage is thus set for more accidents, and the victim becomes more
claim-conscious as he reacts to the indifference of mass medical practice.
Claims against doctors and hospitals are almost certain to increase. This will
cause insurance premiums to rise, such increase, of course, being passed on
to the public. Perhaps of all forms of insurance, public liability insurance is
the most expensive. It never returns to the beneficiaries more than 60 cents
on the dollar, the remainder having been spent on overhead and the investi-
gation of tort claims. On the other hand, no-fault accident insurance is in-
expensive and permits the insurer to pay back a very large part of the
premium dollar. Therefore, I propose a system of loss insurance payable
without fault, indemnifying patients for injuries resulting from untoward
results of medical or hospital care, or "medical accidents". It could be ab-
sorbed by adding a few cents to each patient's fee or hospital account. The
effects of loss insurance would be extensive. In particular: (1) Victims of
medical accidents would be assured recovery without undergoing the burden
of hiring lawyers and proving fault, or in the alternative, suffering their losses,
and (2) Doctors and hospitals would be relieved of the threat and stigma of
malpractice claims. Doctors and staff would be released to engage in pro-
gressive diagnosis and therapy.
Some will object that loss insurance will encourage doctors and hospital
staff to be careless. The same argument was advanced against compulsory
automobile insurance and solicitors' indemnity funds. Actually the restrain-
ing influence of tort liability has been found of little consequence. Discipline
committees and the loss of privileges and accreditation are much more power-
ful. In addition, the objection loses much of its force when we observe that
traditional methods have not met the problems of modem medical technology
in our complex delivery system of medical services. Those who still advocate
the retention of the fault method may be able to reconcile themselves by
19Articles dealing with the subject of loss insurance include: C. Morris, Mal-
practice Crisis - A View of Malpractice in the 1970's (1971), 38 Insurance Counsel
Journal 521; D. K. Deitrich, Medical Malpractice Litigation: Some Suggested Improve-
ments nd a Possible Alternative (1965-66), 18 University of Florida L. Rev. 623; A.A.
Ehrenzweig, Compulsory 'Hospital-Accident" Insurance: A Needed First Step Toward
tile Displacement of Liability for 'Medical Malpractice' (1963-64), 31 University of
Chicago L. Rev. 279.
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going along part way and instituting a loss policy without fault for stipulated
accident benefits, to be accepted by the victim on account of his loss in the
same manner as the Ontario automobile compensation scheme, thus enabling
the victim to sue for the excess and the doctor or hospital to resist on the
basis of fault.
Loss Insurance without fault would thus appear to represent the best
solution to the problems encountered in this area.

